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Management of Tax Security Knowledge in Intra-
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Konrad Raczkowski1 and Artur Krukowski2
Summary: This chapter explores the issues of knowledge appreciation and knowledge 
management in the context of securing VAT in intra-community trade. This knowledge 
is proven to be necessary to both honest taxpayers carrying out legal economic activity 
as well as to bodies enforcing the tax law. The VAT to be presented has been deliberately 
selected owing to the ever-growing number of VAT scams within fraudulent tax “car-
ousel” schemes; they involve multiple exports and imports of the same goods (in many 
cases exclusively based on fictitious invoices) through a diverse chain of supplies in a 
variety of EU countries.  
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Introduction
Taxes have a long-standing history as a source of revenue for state budgets. 
Throughout history, however, taxes due were collected in the form of both 
tributes (e.g., crops, commodities) as well as in monetary sums. Taxes are an 
ordinary phenomenon in the functioning of societies and within the society 
many groups seek legal optimization of tax burdens, whereas others seek 
quite the opposite, pre determining the performance of unlawful activities 
which are driven by a desire to make profit and which indirectly reduce the 
economic security of the state where the malpractice of diminishing manda-
tory money obligations takes place. 
 It suffices to mention that in the European Union (EU) itself new oppor-
tunities of destabilizing tax security, notably with regard to Value Added 
Tax (VAT, arose due to the establishment of free movement of persons, 
goods, services, and capital within the single internal market. Thus, trade 
transactions from various EU countries since 1993 are no longer subject to 
control at internal borders, and the VAT rate in the case of intra-Community 
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supply of goods is zero percent, with the tax being paid by the purchaser in 
another country. 
 VAT governed by normative regulations in specific EU member states 
is one of the major revenues for the state budget. Though the concept of 
value added tax was developed already in 1919 by C. F. Siemens, its practi-
cal application has only been made possible since 1954. The factors under-
lying the abuse of the whole system by dishonest tax payers for the pur-
pose of perpetrating tax fraud in relation to VAT are the scarcely precise, 
fairly liberal and basic structure of the Sixth Council Directive3 as well as 
the currently applying Council Directive 2006/112/EC,4 in combination with 
a complex mechanism for settlement of this tax. As the scale of fraud in this 
respect is significant, it is necessary to comprehend that the knowledge and 
its management within VAT security proves to be one of the more substan-
tial elements in the protection of budget revenue in the EU member states. 
Towards Knowledge Management 
A distinguished expert in management, P. Drucker (1909–2005) was one of 
the first to highlight that knowledge and knowledge expert workers con-
stitute the principal assets of the enterprise or organization—depreciating 
somehow natural resources, capital, or work. Around 1960, he defined the 
term knowledge work and knowledge worker.5 He also asserted that
we know now that the source of wealth is something specifically 
human: knowledge. If we apply knowledge to tasks we already know 
how to do, we call it “productivity.” If we apply knowledge to tasks 
that are new and different we call it “innovation.” Only knowledge 
allows us to achieve these two goals.6
3 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws 
of the Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: 
uniform basis of assessment, OJ 1977 L 145, case 09-1–23.
4 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value 
addend tax, OJ L 347, 11.12.2006.
5 E. Skrzypek, “Wiedza jako czynnik sukcesu w nowej gospodarce” (Knowledge as 
a factor for success in the new economy), in E. Skrzypek, A. Sokół, eds., Zarządzanie 
kapitałem ludzkim w gospodarce opartej na wiedzy (Management of human capital in an 
economy based on knowledge) (Warsaw: Instytut Wiedzy i Innowacji, 2009), p. 145.
6 P. F. Drucker, Managing for the Future: The 1990s and Beyond (Oxford: Butterworth-
Heinemann, 1992), p. 23.
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 Knowledge is created by people due to mutual interactions between 
them and their environment. Therefore to appreciate the core of knowledge 
it is necessary to explore and understand the human being and the reaction 
process which generates knowledge. It is human relations that are a source 
of creation of knowledge, knowledge is subjective, relational in process, 
esthetical and generated in practice. For this reason the core of knowledge 
and process of knowledge creation need to be oriented toward a man and 
acting in a manner conducive to producing a kind of added value in the 
form of new knowledge for both a person as well as for an organization.7
 K. R. Popper argues that knowledge never starts out of nothing; as a 
starting point it always needs some general background of knowledge 
which is recognized as prevailing at a definite time alongside its difficulties 
and problems. In principle it arises out of a contradiction between expecta-
tions embedded in our general background of knowledge from one side, 
and a new outcome such as observations or a certain hypothesis suggested 
by them on the other hand.8 Therefore, knowledge is a result of all possible 
acts of cognitive understanding— where knowledge is a result of cogni-
tive processes and cognition is, to a large extent, conditional on knowledge 
already possessed (the level of possessed knowledge determines the chance 
of cognitive choice of the object as well as a manner of cognition).9
Knowledge, however, is more difficult to define – one is to see it as 
using information to make a decision. Knowledge is more on know-
ing how to interpret information and providing new insights to some 
problem at hand. It is often using previous experience to interpret the 
information and use the interpretation to initiate some action. Thus 
knowing the temperature influences a person’s choice of what to 
7 See K. Raczkowski, “Zarządzanie wiedzą w organizacji inteligentnej” (Knowledge 
management in an intelligent organization), in S. Lachiewicz, A. Zakrzewska-Bielawska, 
eds., Zarządzanie wiedzą i innowacjami (Knowledge and innovations management) (Łódź: 
Politechnika Łódzka, 2010).
8 K. R. Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (Wiedza obiektywna. 
Ewolucyjna teoria epistemologiczna) (Warsaw: PWN, 2002), p. 93.
9 A. G. Neweś,  “Stan zasobów wiedzy w polskich przedsiębiorstwach w świetle 
badań empirycznych” (State of knowledge resources in Polish enterprises in the light of 
empirical research), in J. Bogdanienko, M. Kuzela, I. Sobczak, eds., Zarządzanie wiedzą w 
warunkach globalnej współpracy przedsiębiorstw (Knowledge management in circumstances 
of global cooperation among enterprises) (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2008), 
p. 42.
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wear based on their earlier experience in similar weather. Knowledge 
arrives in many forms.10 
 Relying on the realistic theory of knowledge it is possible to present 
a clock-like structure of the author’s knowledge; likewise the knowledge 
structure by A. Jashapara contains previous experiences forming extensive 
networks of social, political, economic, and organizational relations.  
 A time-related arrangement of knowledge refers to the metaphor of a 
clock—to 24 hours within a day; the reference to hours, determining succes-
sive needs or possibilities for application of knowledge and passing time, 
being a synonym of passing knowledge if it fails to be preserved and codi-
fied. Also a clock represents the future which we have to confront using 
experiences acquired in the past; the past to which we cannot return physi-
cally but only metaphysically. A clock like structure of knowledge placed on 
a knowledge axis involves three major components:
 a) Experience radar (seconds), assessing each situation systematically 
and straightaway, making use of afterthought, retrospective, and experi-
ences analogously to an active radar, with a pointer counting seconds sym-
bolizing a radiating beam that explores a specific area within which all sig-
nals are caught, received, and processed. Depending on the time pressure, 
the meaning of data, information, and consequently knowledge may take 
on a standardized shape in the form of quick reaction (as in single loop 
learning, without use of afterthought) or long impulses—a longer time for 
searching (as in double loop learning and extensive deployment of creative 
and reflective thinking).
 b) Explicit knowledge (minutes)—as overall knowledge being within 
a prevailing circulation. It may be gleaned from books, newspapers, radio, 
and television broadcasting, verbally, via the Internet, and other message 
types, it is a type of external knowledge regarding an individual and is 
codified.
 c) Tacit knowledge (hours) is a type of specific personal knowledge. It 
includes all conditional circumstances, habits and culture, religious, social 
and other assumptions. It is the most precious knowledge as only its user 
is aware of what knowledge he possesses and only he may apply a specific 
10 I. Hawryszkiewycz, Knowledge Management: Organizing Knowledge Based Enterprises 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 72.
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scope of knowledge to a specific place and time. Successful use of tacit 
knowledge may be achieved by dynamic interaction and teamwork which 
deploys explicit knowledge (hour hand) as well as operational-strategic 
radar of experiences (second hand).11
 The foregoing assumptions indicate that a man faced with a new situ-
ation and new problems frequently refers to the previously gained knowl-
edge and intuition he possesses. He determines a response by transform-
ing possessed knowledge into actions. The foundations of the knowledge 
structure are previous experiences which further both knowledge types: “I 
know how” as well as “I know what” (tacit and explicit knowledge). It is 
suggested that usage of the experience radar is a specific example of double 
loop, deepened learning. It means that the radar every time refers to both 
reflective thinking as well as to experiences of the man, thus opening up 
new thinking perspectives in a specific case. Thus, it leads to the restriction 
of routine and generation of new ideas which may improve or destabilize 
functioning of a given organization.12 
 So what does knowledge management mean? According to R. von Spek 
and G. Carter, knowledge management in numerous cases is synonymous 
with a concept of an organization being in a process of learning, sharing 
with good practices, competence management, business excellence, man-
agement of innovations or intellectual capital.13 Knowledge management is 
inextricably linked with a man who stores the resource of knowledge and 
a man has the capability of adding possessed knowledge to this repository. 
Above all he decides whether, when, and to what extent to avail himself of 
collected data and information and convert them into knowledge and then 
use it in a proper place and time through wisdom with the purpose of mate-
rializing knowledge. 
 An integrated approach towards defining the core of knowledge man-
agement is demonstrated by A. Jashapara. An author that while depict-
ing strategic, systemic, and social perspectives, specifies knowledge 
11 K. Raczkowski, Zarządzanie wiedzą administracji celnej w systemie bezpieczeństwa 
ekonomiczno-społecznego (Management of customs administration knowledge in a system 
of economic-social security;  ms.) (Warsaw: 2010).
12 Ibid., p. 71.
13 R. Spek, G. Carter, “A survey on good practices in knowledge management in Euro-
pean companies,” in K. Martins, P. Heisig, J. Vorbeck, eds., Knowledge Management: Con-
cepts and Best Practices (Berlin: Springer, 2003), p. 196.
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management as the “effective processes of learning related to discovering, 
applying and sharing human knowledge (both codified as well as non-cod-
ified); they deploy appropriate technologies and organizational culture for 
the purpose of expanding the intellectual capital of the organization and 
enhancing the efficiency of its operations.”14 
 It seems that currently in many cases the term knowledge management 
is incorrectly associated with transfer of documents or accessibility and 
application of computer networks. In fact knowledge management consti-
tutes the whole system of methods, forms, and means designed to guaran-
tee effective economic and social functioning in an organization. An organi-
zation or rather its management is tasked to create such an organizational 
culture in which members of the organization will be aware of the necessity 
to cooperate appropriately both in an internal (intra-organizational) envi-
ronment as well as an external one by means of localization as well as gain-
ing, developing, sharing, applying, and storing the knowledge.
Value Added Tax in EU Countries
Value Added Tax is a turnover of indirect tax—which is assumed to affect to 
the least degree the final prices of goods and services that are subject to taxa-
tion due to so-called transferability on subsequent phases of the economic 
trade. It is the multi-phase tax that is really offloaded on to the consumer; 
the recipient of goods and services. 
 Maurice Lauré, a former French minister of economy, is considered one 
of the creators of VAT, which came into effect for the first time in 1954. In 
1993, standard VAT rates were established; they could not be lower than 
15 percent or higher than 25 percent, with the reservation that states could 
apply a single reduced rate as well as transitional rate in subsequent years. 
In recent years VAT rates have been subject to numerous changes; the cur-
rent standard percentage ratio ranges from 15 percent for Cyprus and Lux-
embourg, to 25 percent for Hungary, Denmark, and Sweden (see Table 1).
  
14 A. Jashapara, Knowledge Management: An Integrated Approach (Harlow: Pearson Edu-
cation, 2004), p. 12.
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Table 1� VAT rates in 27 EU Member States, 2010  
No� State Standard rate (%) Reduced rate (%)
1. Cyprus 15 5; 8
2. Luxemburg 15 6; 12; 3
3. Great Britain 20 5
4. Spain 18 8; 4
5. Malta 18 5
6. Germany 19 7
7. Holland 19 6
8. Romania 24 9
9. Slovakia 19 6; 10
10. France 19.6 5.5; 2.1
11. Estonia 20 9
12. Czech Republic 20 10
13. Bulgaria 20 7
14. Italy 20 10; 4
15. Portugal 21 5; 12
16. Austria 20 10
17. Slovenia 20 8.5
18. Latvia 21 10
19. Belgium 21 6; 12
20. Ireland 21 13.5; 4.8
21. Lithuania 21 5; 9
22. Poland 22 7; 3
23. Greece 23 11; 4.5
24. Finland 23 9; 13
25. Hungary 25 5; 18
26. Denmark 25 -
27. Sweden 25 6; 12
EU 27 Average 20.5
Source: Based on Taxation trends in the European Union (Luxembourg: Publication 
Office of the European Union, 2010), p. 100.
 At the beginning of the twenty-first century, VAT was applied in 118 
countries. The United States was an exception. As a strong global economic 
power, it was the only country within the OECD which did not have VAT in 
its structure of tax contributions.15 
15 See Combating VAT fraud in the EU: The way forward (Brussels: International VAT 
Association, 2007), p. 11; and Consumption Tax Trends (Paris: OECD, 2004).
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 Currently all enterprises that desire to conduct business within the 
European Union need to have a VAT number.16 The structure of identifica-
tion numbers in the EU states mostly comprises of about 8–12 numbers, 
preceded by a descriptor comprising one or two letters, e.g., ATU1111111117 
(Austria, 9 characters; the first position following the prefix is always “U”), 
BE0111111111 (Belgium, 10 digits; the first character following the prefix is 
always zero “0”), PL1111111111 (Poland, 10 digits), SE111111111111 (Swe-
den, 12 digits). But the most heterogeneous structure of VAT identification 
numbers can be identified in Great Britain where four formats operate: 
blocks of 3, 4, and 2 digits: GB111 1111 11 or GB111 1111 11 111, GBGD111 
(in relation to government departments), or GBHA111 (in relation to health 
authorities).18
Fig. 1. Characterization of possibilities for use of VAT Information Exchange 
System (VIES)
Source: Taxation and Customs Union Database
16 EU VAT registered taxpayers are obligated to lodge an application and confirm reg-
istration of economic activity in the EU in order to avoid double taxation in member 
states.
17 A digit 1 in a presented sequence of characters is only an example of illustrating the 
number of digits in a sequence of characters in a specific structure of the tax identifica-
tion number.
18 See Taxation and Customs Union,  “VAT identification number structure,” Brussels 
2008, https://www.verisign.com/partners/vsvatformat.pdf 
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 The VAT Information Exchange System (VIES)— see Fig. 1—constitutes 
an efficient tool used to exchange information regarding VAT (especially 
in relation to intra-Community supplies) among EU tax administrations as 
well as to confirm the VAT number.
 The system does not enable collective examination of VAT numbers of 
the economic entities; neither does it provide full access to the type of eco-
nomic activity conducted by the registered taxpayer. Yet, although it facili-
tates verification of whether a given entity is registered and currently active 
or not (response 0–1), it implies that it is impossible to check the previous 
activity of the given entity, for example, that of a few months ago.
Tax Fraud—Challenges to Security with Regard to VAT
As a result of the evolution of crime mechanisms which frequently involve 
hundreds of people, there are many cases of tax scams, notably involving 
VAT. An annual scale of scam VAT in the EU states—fraudsters assisted 
by high-priced tax consultants and consulting agencies are increasingly 
improving their knowledge of the European VAT system—is estimated at a 
level close to €100 billion. Such a huge scale of scams poses a danger not only 
to the budgets of single countries but also to that of the entire EU budget.
 However, a key issue is the reason for such behavior, which historically 
has tended to be the same, namely the desire to make profits quickly. It also 
transpires that dishonest taxpayers may also quite easily exploit regulations 
of single laws on VAT, which correspond in principle with the structure of 
directives. 
 First, following the implementation of the EU directive into the legal 
system of specific states, new regulations became noticeable; they regard 
among others taxation of transactions among the EU states including intra-
Community supply of goods and intra-Community acquisition of goods. In 
this context a tax rate at zero percent for the intra-Community supplies is of 
major importance. 
 Such a rate is exceptionally beneficial for a taxpayer as all possible VAT 
from such supply (from the previous phase of trade/turnover) may be prac-
tically subject to refund to the bank account of the taxpayer. Yet, to achieve 
such preferential tax assessment/settlement there are formal requirements 
that have to be fulfilled with regard to, among others, documents certify-
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ing such supply between VAT-registered taxpayers from two various EU 
countries.
 Second, in a majority of member states taxable persons may, as a rule, 
deduct from the tax due purchases insofar as the goods and services used 
for their taxable business activities. In practice each invoice with a deduct-
ible tax, even from a dishonest trader, is  extremely beneficial to a taxpayer; 
after taking into account that he is entitled to reduce his tax paid to a tax 
office or apply for a refund of the excess between the calculated tax and due 
tax.
 Third, the issue of the refund of VAT (if there is an excess between tax 
due and calculated tax). The tax refund shall be transferred to a bank account 
indicated by a taxpayer within statutory time limits (e.g., 60 days). It must 
be manifestly underlined that financial funds obtained as VAT refund on the 
bank account are exempt from any extra tax burdens, specifically they are 
not taxable income subject to the law on personal income tax (and similarly 
exempt from corporate income tax).19
 Fourth, after the European Union has been joined by a given country the 
check-in (clearance) proceedings cease to be carried out. Consequently, no 
officer can confirm the movement of goods across the border. Such a prac-
tice is the result of the EU principle of free trade among the member states. 
The procedure continues to apply in relation to the export of goods, that is, 
their transportation across EU borders. What is interesting is that the scale 
of fraud is far smaller, since at the moment the only proof evidencing that a 
trader from an EU state has received goods are the documents prepared in 
accordance with the requirements of the tax on goods and services law. It 
is clearly a vulnerability of the VAT system, which may be used to facilitate 
scams. 
 Fifth, tax bodies never assume that a taxpayer acts in bad faith, and if 
he is a VAT-registered taxpayer who lodged a tax return VAT-7 or VAT-7K 
within the time limit and claimed a refund from tax on goods and services, 
he has a good chance of receiving the refund within the statutory time lim-
its.20 As a rule, such a refund will certainly be verified, yet if all documents 
appear correct, the tax body is obliged to refund the difference of the tax. 
19 Law on personal income tax of July 26, 1991, uniform text from 2000, Dz. U. No. 14, 
item 176 as amended.
20  Characterized numeration of the tax return may be differently numbered in various 
EU states.
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The interesting aspect is that the above construction is totally separated 
from payment for goods; which would be extremely helpful while conduct-
ing an investigation and may prove that the transaction has taken place. 
 Given the foregoing defects of the tax on goods and services system we 
may identify the prevailing types of tax fraud:
• Understating or not disclosing receipts due to counterfeiting 
and concealing invoices
• Extortion scam of the calculated VAT
• Theft of tax identification numbers, registration of fake com-
panies (fraud type: missing trader)
• Carousel frauds including frauds with the participation of 
numerous groups of entities from at least a few member 
states, also called Olympic rings
 Missing trader fraud has not yet been defined in legal terms but may 
be characterized as an entity’s activity involving VAT registration of a ficti-
tious enterpriser in order to avoid tax payment. In the whole structure it 
is the tax authorities that suffer losses.21 In most cases a trader that regis-
ters for VAT uses data which are inconsistent with the actual circumstances 
(e.g., indication of a private apartment as an office for business or indication 
of false address). Another rule that applies in the procedure is that regis-
tration is made by a person who does not actually run the business (e.g., 
unemployed or foreigner). Registration is repeatedly made on the basis of 
stolen documents. A distinctive feature of the trader that tends to avoid tax 
in this way also involves an imprecisely defined scope of his activities (i.e., 
a trader deals with production and trade as well as services). Further the 
above described trader frequently changes bank accounts and usually pos-
sesses many accounts. 
 One of the simplest mechanisms of missing trader fraud refers to a trans-
action where goods are transferred between two EU states. An intra-Com-
munity transaction is performed between trader A (a member of state X) 
and trader B (a member of state Y) in such a way that trader A, in dispatch-
ing goods to trader B, makes intra-Community supply of goods and trader 
21 P. Rochowicz, “Don’t let yourself get involved into the carousel,” Rzeczpospolita, 
March 24, 2005. 
Management of Tax Security Knowledge in Intra-Community Trade182
B makes intra-Community acquisition of goods. Then trader B will make 
domestic delivery of the previously acquired goods to another trader C 
(also a member of state Y).
 In this scheme traders A and C may be legally operating enterprisers, 
yet B may not report intra-Community acquisition of goods and, above all, 
makes a domestic transaction at the price including VAT but fails to pay this 
tax. Missing traders often submit tax returns including the VAT but they 
fail to pay it. Usually the business of such traders ceases to continue when 
the tax authorities discover the fraud. However, due to lack of property and 
assets, further actions by these authorities appear unsuccessful. In addition 
trader B is aware that without paying the VAT, he will be able to sell goods 
at dumping prices.
 A more complicated scheme refers to the situation in which a missing 
trader, B, will acquire goods from a legally operating trader, A, and then he 
will make domestic delivery of the previously acquired goods to another 
trader, C. Traders A and C are legally operating enterprisers. At the same 
time trader B makes a fictitious intra-Community supply of goods to the 
benefit of another trader D in another member state, thus evading payment 
of VAT. In this specific event trader D may be a VAT taxpayer and unaware 
of the fraud when his VAT number was utilized used by a missing trader. 
However, it may arise that this trader will be a partner of enterprisers per-
petrating the fraud.  
 In both cases a decisive element in terminating this malpractice is 
prompt reaction on the part of the tax authorities.22 Taxpayers carrying out 
intra-Community transactions are obligated to disclose them in summing up 
information on VAT returns. In most EU states, taxpayers are only required 
to disclose the intra-Community supply of goods. This information is fur-
ther transferred to all EU states within the VAT Information Exchange Sys-
tem.23 Therefore, the tax administration of a given country possesses infor-
mation whether its taxpayer performed the intra-Community acquisition 
22 It should be noticed that one of the main problems is that the system which was put 
in place in 1993 for the exchange of information between member states on intra-Com-
munity supplies of goods does not provide relevant and timely information for tackling 
VAT fraud efficiently. See Communication from the Commission to the Council concern-
ing some key elements contributing to the establishment of the VAT anti fraud strategy 
within the EU, SEC (2007) 1584.
23 VIES is an integrated IT system enabling exchange of information on transactions 
among VAT registered taxpayers within the European Union.
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of goods and is capable of taking measures to verify legality and proper 
procedures of such a transaction. It may then transpire that the VAT num-
ber24 (e.g., in Poland it is a NIP, the TAX Information Number is preceded 
by a code PL) used in the transaction was only borrowed for the purpose 
of the fraud. In connection with this, an obligation to disclose not only the 
intra-Community supply but also intra-Community acquisition in sum-
mary information brings a greater probability that tax authorities will detect 
all the irregularities in transactions more quickly. Tax administrations in the 
EU states collect information not only about supplies from the EU (within 
VIES), but also about supplies that are disclosed in summary information of 
the VAT return submitted quarterly. In this manner a simple comparison of 
information will provide a full picture of possible inconsistency, which then 
may be analyzed thoroughly. 
 The other type of fraud is the so-called carousel which may be briefly 
described as the movement of goods between two (or more) member states, 
arranged in such a manner that the goods return to the state of origin. Such 
carousel circulation of goods is facilitated by the lack of border checks 
within the EU. In numerous cases of this type of fraud there is only a simu-
lation of the circulation of goods, so no charges such as transportation costs 
are incurred. 
 A common trait of carousel frauds is the lack of collateral in the form of 
trade loans as they are predominantly cash transactions, despite the high 
value of the goods, or transfers to accounts owned by enterprises of legal 
entities which hampers identification of the person in charge of the busi-
ness. Frequently the payments are disguised as supplies which are followed 
by money transfers. However, most often the same amount of funds is in 
circulation throughout the carousel which, after calculation of payments 
made by one trader, create multiplied amounts far exceeding the real one.
 The simplest mechanism of the carousel fraud is built in the following 
way (see Fig. 2):
24 A name for the VAT number may be different in various states, e.g., in Poland there 
applies a number NIP preceded with a code PL.
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Fig� 2� Basic scheme of carousel fraud in the EU states
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Source: The author
1. Trader A having its registered office in a member state X sells 
goods on to trader B with the registered office in a state Y 
(due to intra-Community supply of goods trader X has a zero 
rate and possible VAT refund) at a total price of €100,000. 
2. Trader B which is most often a missing taxpayer25 resells the 
goods on to buffer trader C with a loss of €80,000 + VAT (e.g., 
at a rate of 20 percent it is €16,000). Trader C has a registered 
office in a state Y (certainly issuing a proper VAT invoice—yet 
it fails to pay VAT to a relevant tax authority). Thus, trader 
B acts to the detriment of tax authority and goes missing (or 
ceases to exist) without paying the tax for domestic supply 
of goods. 
3. Subsequently, sale of the goods by trader C may be made 
with a negligible profit (e.g., selling the goods for €85,000 + 
VAT) and further traders, e.g., D and E (brokers), will settle 
VAT properly.
25 Importers (being purchasers) may receive goods without paying VAT for intra-
Community acquisition and at the same time they have to pay VAT from their sale.
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4. The last element in the chain, trader E will make an intra-
Community supply of goods to a trader which began the 
carousel, i.e., to trader A. Since the intra-Community sup-
ply is zero rated (?) trader E will be entitled to claim back 
the VAT on the bank account (trader E sells the goods on to 
trader A for, e.g., €95,000 and recovers the whole calculated 
VAT, that is €17,000, from the tax office). Traders D and E are 
labeled buffer traders and trade with missing tax payers. 
However, unlike missing traders they duly discharge their 
tax obligations.26 
 The scheme presented above may be repeated until the tax administra-
tion of a given state interrupts this malpractice. It needs to be highlighted 
that supply of goods is made on the basis of invoices issued at proper 
intervals. A more complicated structure of the carousel fraud will involve 
numerous missing tax payers in its chain, thus rendering the whole situa-
tion increasingly blurred. Further, it makes the cracking of this mechanism 
of fraud extremely labor-intensive and time consuming. Additionally such 
carousels may encompass many member states creating so-called Olympic 
rings.  
 A report by the European Commission regarding carousel frauds 
and offenses while acquiring goods (SCAC 364 document) collected and 
described a total of 151 fraud cases.27 Key conclusions refer to, excepting 
scam mechanisms, the types of goods that are frequently the objects of the 
transaction. To achieve the best financial outcome fraudsters mostly prefer 
to transfer mobile phones and their accessories, computers, and IT compo-
nents, expensive electronic equipment, and even luxury cars. Extraordinary 
situations arise when some models of mobile phones become an object of 
transactions even before their release on the market. Recently the assort-
ment of goods has expanded with xenon car bulbs and engine injection sys-
tems. The demand for these goods measured by issued invoices exceeds its 
real yearly demand twofold.28 
26 Mechanism of tax frauds making use of chain transactions, supplement to VAT 
Guide (Poradnik VAT), No. 6,May 10, 2007, Wydawnictwo GOFIN.
27 SCAC 364 – The second report on carousel and acquisition crimes – result of reports 
prepared by the member states, March 31, 2003, TAXUD/2327/03.
28 See M. Duda, Dziennik, March 31, 2010, p. A4.
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 In order to combat the above described fraudulent tax schemes, in spite 
of actions at a national level, there are attempts to introduce systemic solu-
tions through furthering cooperation among the member states’ administra-
tion within the system VIES or SCAC forms as well as multilateral checks.  
 To enhance all-embracing cooperation among tax authorities of the 
member states in respect of fighting against tax frauds, the Council of the 
European Union adopted in October 2003 a new Council Regulations (EC) 
No. 1798/2003 on administrative cooperation in the field of value added tax, 
which came into force on January 1, 2004. 29 The fundamental postulates of 
this document, apart from strengthening the role of VIES, included formal-
izing the thorough exchange of information on intra-Community transac-
tions in a specific EU member state by, among other means, a standard form 
SCAC 2004 which combines a request for information exchange as well as a 
request for administrative proceedings—Articles 5 and 19 of the regulation. 
However, the most significant from the perspective of fighting tax fraud is 
the standard form SCAC 383, intended specifically to counteract missing tax 
payer fraud. 
 It should be underlined that the above findings may be subject to crimi-
nal responsibility for crimes or tax offences pursuant to national regulations 
of criminal and penal laws.30 As described above, a missing tax payer under 
this law may be liable for the following: failing to declare tax or delinquent 
default on payment of a tax. In the case of counterfeiting documents (e.g., 
forging invoices or bills of lading) the sanctions envisaged in the Criminal 
Code of the given country may be applied.31
 Apart from structures set out above and methods for preventing VAT 
scams, the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice has had a substan-
tial impact on determining the approach of tax administrations to this prob-
lem. In regard to this issue, the first judicial decision was made on January 
12, 2006 (combined cases Optigen, Falcrum, Bond House).32 The fact findings 
certainly dealt with a carousel chain of supplies where British traders made 
29 Council Regulations (EC) No. 1798/2003 on administrative cooperation in the field 
of value added tax, OJ L 264, October 15, 2003, p. 1.
30 See e.g. Law of September 10, 1999, Criminal-penal Code, Dz. U. No. 111, item 765 
as amended.
31 E.g. Art. 270 or 271 of the law of June 6, 1997, Criminal Code, Dz. U. No. 88, item 553 
as amended.
32 Judgment of the European Court of Justice of January 12, 2006 (joint cases No. 
C-354/03, C-355/03, C-484/03; Optigen, Falcrum, Bond House).
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an intra-Community supply of goods to traders in various EU states, having 
previously purchased them from missing traders. One of the major find-
ings was that traders had acted in good faith and did not know and were 
unable to know that they were involved in the carousel. Tax bodies denied 
their right to make tax deductions from transactions performed with miss-
ing traders. The Court of Justice in its deliberations, based on the objec-
tive approach towards supply of goods, argued that examining intentions 
stimulating other participants of the supply chain would be in contradiction 
with the objectives of the common VAT system. Also the Court asserted that 
the right to deduct VAT is a basic constructive element of the value added 
tax and as a rule it cannot be restricted. 
 The Court, in its decision, manifestly supported traders acing in good 
faith. It deprived the member states of the right to compensate their losses 
suffered from unpaid VAT on other participants of the carousel fraud. 
 In another judgment of July 6, 2006 (combined cases C-439/04 and 
C-440/04 Kittel i Rewolta),33 the findings were similar, with the exception that 
one of the traders consciously participated in a circulation of supplies that 
constituted tax fraud. In this case, the Court decided that a taxpayer who 
was or should have been aware of involvement in a fraudulent chain of sup-
ply should be, under the 6th Directive, treated as an active fraudster regard-
less of any benefits derived from the malpractice. He cannot be regarded 
as an entity acting in the capacity of the taxpayer and conducting business. 
Therefore, this group is not entitled to exercise its right to deduct the tax 
calculated in accordance with regulations of the 6th Directive. 
 The European Court of Justice therefore, gave a vague green light to 
refuse the entities consciously engaged in tax fraud the right to reduce the 
tax due by a tax calculated in the previous phase of the trade� Yet in this 
event it is exceptionally difficult to show proof evidencing such conscious 
activity of the trader.
33 Judgment of the European Court of Justice of July 6, 2006 (joined cases C-439/04 and 
C-440/04 Kittel i Recolta).
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Concluding Remarks
The foregoing considerations provide an overview of the value added tax 
system which in principle facilitates scams. The approach of the Court of 
Justice in many cases proves to be excessively liberal, which is conducive to 
huge losses in budgets of specific EU member states. To prevent such a situ-
ation, new solutions affecting the whole system of VAT are being proposed 
including the idea to pay VAT at the end of the chain (reverse-charge)34 and 
that the whole system of VAT should be completely unified by eliminating 
diverse reduced special rates which apply exclusively in certain countries 
and to selected groups of goods or services. 
 The other method capable of combating VAT fraud in a systemic way 
(irrespective of any amendments to the VAT system) would be the establish-
ment of a European Union fiscal police—one that is fully task-oriented, flex-
ible, and operative (as practice shows OLAF35 in this structure and system 
of operations is unable to guarantee a minimal degree of security in this 
respect). 
 Such a body should not only be afforded with physical capability to 
operate in real time in any EU member state, but also would have oppor-
tunities of transmitting or verifying information just in time, presupposing 
a proper organizational culture of the integrated system of employees in 
the EU member states combined with efficient and effective application of 
information and communication technology. As practice shows, information 
processed from EUROCANET (European Carousel Network),36 with the use 
of SCAC forms, and multilateral cooperation under the Council Regulation 
(EC) No.1798/2003 of October 7, 2003, on administration cooperation in the 
34 “Union aims counteraction against tax fraudsters,” Gazeta prawna, February 26, 
2008.
35 OLAF, the European Anti-Fraud Office established on the basis of the Commission 
Decision 1999/352/EC. The key task of OLAF is combating frauds and corruption as well 
as protection of European Union interests. Even though the Office is independent as 
regards investigations, the scope of proceedings is considered negligible as compared 
with reported irregularities in the areas of abuse and frauds, notably VAT. A good move 
would be to expand the powers of OLAF in respect to conducting proceedings and 
penalizing controlled prohibited actions and establishment of so-called OLAF coopera-
tion centers located in each EU member state and directly subject to OLAF rather than to 
a particular financial department (as currently in operation).
36 EUROCANET, project initiated by the Belgian administration on January 1, 2005, 
with a view to enhancing cooperation among EU member states due to the quicker trans-
mission of information, and oriented towards counteracting carousel frauds.  
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field of value added tax, are not fully exploited, or their usage should be 
regarded scarcely effective. 
 Possibly the human contribution to this institution should be constituted 
by representatives of police forces, customs services, and the tax adminis-
tration (including tax control) from a given country delegated to discharge 
of specific functions for a term of office, e.g., of 4–5 years. Having completed 
the functional tasks within the national unit of the OLAF they would be able 
to apply for a subsequent term of office or return to their previous organiza-
tional units. 
 Nonetheless, in order to bring about such a revolution entailing changes 
to tax law across all EU member states, as well as establishment of organi-
zational and integrated institutions intended to counteract tax frauds, it is 
necessary to gain broad endorsement and undertake many time consum-
ing discussions and settlements. Proof of this can be seen in the attempts 
to implement the Eurofisc scheme37—construed as EU common operational 
structures aimed at a very fast exchange of targeted information in the area 
of tax frauds through strengthening administrative cooperation. 
 Beyond doubt, in this regard, it will be a challenge to set up an appro-
priate framework for collaboration a model and concept of management 
knowledge which enables conversion of data into information, information 
into knowledge, and then knowledge through human wisdom expressed as 
practical application. Yet, it is unlikely to happen without intervention, but 
only when an administration from each state will be capable of obtaining 
and making use of human resources, or rather intellectual capital—which 
is currently possessed but not used (usually because of personal motives of 
a particular decision-maker) as well as that which is lacking and ought to 
be gained. Knowledge is a key for establishment as well as reinforcing per-
manent competitive advantages of a given organization or society, and man 
37 An attempt to establish Eurofisc is a very good solution given that all EU states 
will obligatorily participate in the Project (it is also recommended for an entity to have 
legal status—autonomous or within OLAF structures). Original guidelines of Eurofisc 
provide for four principles of functioning: each state will individually decide on par-
ticipation in specific activities of the network, confidentiality and active cooperation in 
exchange of information, and lack of additional encumbrances for the trader. See Eurofisc 
project 11714/08 FISC 91 as well as Communication from the Commission to the Council, 
The European Parliament, The European Economic and Social Committee, COM (2008) 
807 final, Brussels, December 1, 2008, and Press Release of the Council of the European 
Union 13784/08 (Press 279), Luxembourg, October 7, 2008.
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is its carrier. Until specific organizations integrated within a single commu-
nity apprehend these correlations in a practical manner, all deliberations on 
optimization of activities in the field of fighting threats to economic secu-
rity though the viewpoint of tax will be solely diversions burdened with a 
smaller or larger error of success in practical application, giving ground to 
the black economy and illegal organized activities.
